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DISCOVERY OF THE PLAINTIFF'S MENTAL 





DAVID A. ROBINSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Psychotherapy has an unpleasant side effect for patients who 
happen to be victims of employment discrimination. If they sue 
their employers for discrimination and claim emotional distress 
damages, their employers will demand to see their therapy records.1 
* Member, Massachusetts Bar; B.A., 1974, George Washington University; J.D., 
1977, Washington University (St. Louis). The author practices employment law in 
Springfield, Massachusetts, representing both employers and employees. 
1. See, e.g., Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.RD. 296, 298 (£.0. Pa. 
1983) (allowing defendant to inspect plaintiffs "entire life's history of both medical and 
psychological problems" in racial discrimination case); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 
F.RD. 481, 485 (D. Utah 1987) (employer demanded employee undergo medical and 
psychological examination in sexual harassment suit); Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 
P.2d 404, 409-10 (Cal. 1987) (employer demanded employee undergo medical and psy­
chological examination in sexual harassment suit); EEOC Issues Policy Guidance on 
Availability of Damages Under 1991 Act, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 'll 5360, at 6225 
n.14 (July 14, 1992) [hereinafter EEOC Guidance] (Text of Enforcement Guidance No. 
915.002, Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission) (employer "may be able to 
obtain records of medical andlor psychiatric treatments for conditions relevant to the 
complained of symptoms"). Contra Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 33, 126 
F.RD. 422, 426 (D. Mass. 1989) (prohibiting defendant from inspecting therapy records 
in race discrimination case). 
Lawyers for plaintiffs warn their clients: 
If compensatory damages are sought, then plaintiffs must be forewarned and 
prepared to give in-depth testimony about their emotional pain and suffering. 
Once the claim of emotional pain and suffering is introduced, then plaintiff 
probably must be prepared to lay bare her entire psychiatric and medical his­
tory, although counsel should make every attempt, where possible, to limit the 
intrusion into areas of privacy. Defendant's counsel will attempt to prove that 
any present mental anguish was caused not by the discriminatory acts, but by 
other personal problems such as marital difficulties, family deaths, etc. Plain­
tiff and her attorney must be fully prepared for this type of inquiry, which will 
undoubtedly be quite painful to the plaintiff. 
1 JANICE GOODMAN, ED., EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION: PLEADING AND PRACTICE 
§ 2.07[4][a] (1993). For specific examples of the questions defense counsel might ask, 
see DOUGLAS DANNER, PATfERN DISCOVERY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PI 
6:366, at 412-13 (Supp. 1992). 
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For these employees, the Civil Rights Act of 19912 ("CRA 91") is 
like a rainbow. They can reach their "pot of gold" only after brav­
ing a fierce storm which washes away their privacy and lays bare 
their most intimate secrets. 
The "pot of gold," of course, is an award of compensatory 
damages for emotional distress under CRA 91.3 Prior to the enact­
ment of CRA 91, such damages (often the largest part of the total 
damages awarded)4 were not recoverable under the leading federal 
anti-discrimination statute-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.5 The "storm" is the humiliating torrent of discovery requests 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 u.s.c.). 
3. Id. § 102 (codified as amended at 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3) (Supp. III 
1991». Compensatory damages include damages for "future pecuniary losses, emo­
tional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss ofenjoyment of life, and other 
nonpecuniary losses." 42 u.s.c. § 1981(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added). 
4. See, e.g., Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 
1993) (awarding $125,000 in actual damages and front pay, and $150,000 for emotional 
distress); Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated on other 
grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2791 (1991) (awarding $125,000 in general damages, $500,000 in 
punitive damages); Patrickson v. Westvaco, Envelope Div., 15 Mass. Discrimination L. 
Rep. (New Eng. Legal Pub.) 1642, 1664 (Sept. 23,1993) (Parks, Commr.) (awarding no 
back pay and $100,000 for emotional distress); Norman v. Andover Country Club, 15 
Mass. Discrimination L. Rep. (New Eng. Legal Pub.) 1394, 1421-23 (July 29,1993) (Lee, 
Hearing Officer) (awarding $6,541.68 in back pay and $75,000 in emotional distress). 
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 2oo0e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991». The 
statute prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Emotional distress 
damages were (and are) recoverable under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1981 (1988), but this statute applies only to racial discrimination. Foster v. MCI Tele­
communications Corp., 773 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that emotional distress 
damages recoverable under U.S.C. § 1981 (1988»; see also infra notes 12-13 and accom­
panying text (emotional distress damages for sexual harassment were available under 
tort theory or under state anti-discrimination statute in some states prior to CRA 91). 
CRA 91 also provides punitive damages in Title VII cases. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(I) 
(Supp. III 1991). Although punitive damages theoretically serve a different purpose 
than emotional distress damages, they are often interchangeable in the minds of judges 
and jurors. There have been some large punitive damage awards which easily could 
have been classified as emotional distress damages. See, e.g., Johnson v. Armored 
Transp. of Cal., Inc., 813 F.2d 1041, 1042 (9th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (allowing in a race 
discrimination case $45,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive dam­
ages); Contardo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 406, 412 
(D. Mass. 1990) (allowing in a sex discrimination case $1 in actual damages and 
$250,000 in punitive damages); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 584 (Ariz. 1987) (en 
bane) (finding that a sexual harassment victim was fondled, her career threatened and 
that she suffered severe emotional distress; the jury awarded $10,000 in compensatory 
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages). 
CRA 91 places a cap ranging from $50,000 to $300,000 (depending on the size of 
the employer's workforce) on compensatory and punitive damages recoverable under 
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which the discrimination victim must answer in order to prove that 
the discrimination, and not some other difficulty in the victim's life, 
was the proximate cause of the alleged emotional distress.6 
This article argues that such intrusive discovery is, in most em-
Title VII. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991). This cap also applies to damages 
under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991) 
("ADA"), but does not apply to racial discrimination cases brought pursuant to 42 
U.S.c. § 1981 (Supp. III 1991), nor does it preempt the higher awards available under 
state law in many jurisdictions. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1981(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. III 1991). Under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 
IV 1992) ("ADEA"), liquidated damages are recoverable for "willful" violations, 
§ 626(b), but "compensatory" damages are not recoverable. See Johnson v. Al Tech 
Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that scope of ADEA 
includes authority to grant "legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate 
the purposes of [ADEA]"). But see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 112 S. Ct. 
1028,1037-38 (1992) (holding that compensatory damages are available in Title IX (ed­
ucational institutions) sexual harassment cases, because Congress expressed no intent 
to negate presumption of such damages). 
6. A defendant's strategy for discovery of the plaintiffs psychological history is 
typically as follows: 
Now, because [CRA 91] allows for compensatory damages and plaintiffs can 
be expected to seek such relief in virtually every case, inquiry at the plaintiffs 
deposition will concern all related matters, for example, symptoms, psycholog­
ical and medical treatment, medication, therapists' and physicians' records, 
family and personal relationships, traumatic experiences, job-related stress, 
and other possible sources of harassment, tension, or stress. 
Once the plaintiff puts his or her mental or physical condition in contro­
versy, the court, upon a showing of good cause, may order the plaintiff to 
submit to a physical examination by a physician or a mental examination by a 
psychologist or physician. 
. .. [T]he defendant should request the plaintiff to identify any experts 
[psychiatrists, psychologists, or therapists] early in the litigation process. If the 
plaintiff delays producing this information, the employer should aggressively 
pursue obtaining it as quickly as possible by appropriate means. 
. .. [T]he defendant should obtain, through discovery, each expert's re­
port and any underlying documents. 
Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a Sexual Harassment Case After the Civil Rights Act of 
1991,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037,1051-52 (1993) (footnotes omitted). See generally 
Steven B. Bisbing, Challenging Psychological Damages Claims in Civil Litigation, 59 
DEF. COUNS. J. 358 (1992); Paul R. Lees-Haley & Marias Werkow, Confronting Em­
ployment-Related Claims for Emotional Distress, 56 DEF. COUNS. J. 454, 457 (1989). 
Defense counsel will likely probe the plaintiffs emotional history even if the plain­
tiff does not specifically allege emotional distress in her complaint. See Lees-Haley & 
Werkow, supra, at 455 (citing Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) which discusses Federal Rule of Civil Proce­
dure 54(c». A jury can award such damages regardless of whether the plaintiff explic­
itly asks for them in her pleadings. Thus, the only way a plaintiff can avoid such 
discovery is to explicitly waive her right to emotional distress damages. But see Acosta 
v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 208-09 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing, in a decision prior to 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to compel a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 35 mental 
examination of an age discrimination plaintiff who did not seek or allege emotional 
distress). 
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ployment discrimination cases, unfair to plaintiffs and contrary to 
the legislative purpose of the civil rights laws. The article suggests 
solutions which attempt to reconcile the employee's right to privacy 
with the employer's need to defend itself against false or exagger­
ated claims. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
A. Three Distraught Plaintiffs 
Consider three hypothetical plaintiffs-Betty, Sue, and Joe. 
Betty's male co-workers are constantly leering at her, commenting 
about her body, swearing, telling dirty jokes, and asking her for 
dates. Betty always refuses. When Betty complains to manage­
ment, she is demoted. 
Although she periodically suffered headaches before the har­
assment began, since then her headaches have worsened. She con­
sults a psychiatrist, who diagnoses Betty's condition as mild 
depression. During therapy sessions Betty reveals much about her 
past, including the fact that at age seventeen she had an abortion. 
She feels guilty about this, having been raised in a strict Catholic 
home. Her parents still do not know about the abortion. Mean­
while, Betty sues her employer for sexual harassment.7 
Sue learns that she is pregnant and tells her boss. A few weeks 
later Sue and another employee-who is not pregnant-are told 
that they are terminated because their jobs have been eliminated 
due to "downsizing." A week later Sue learns that her job was not 
really eliminated. In fact, someone was hired to replace her. Sue 
suffers a miscarriage and blames it on the stress caused by the ter­
mination. She sues for pregnancy discrimination.8 Sue was in ther­
apy last year due to marital problems. 
Joe is an African-American whose new boss uses racial epi­
thets at work. He also frequently tells Joe that blacks are intellectu­
ally inferior to whites. Joe finds this very upsetting and gets a 
stomach ache every morning as he drives to work, dreading what 
the boss might say that day. Joe also has been seeing a therapist. 
Among the issues they have discussed is Joe's uncertainty about his 
7. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 V.S. 57, 65 (1986); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Com­
mission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 c.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993) 
(EEOC's sexual harassment regUlations). 
8. Pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. 42 V.S.c. § 2000e(k) 
(1988). 
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sexual orientation. Joe is fired for being two minutes late to work 
one morning and sues for racial discrimination. 
B. Defense Strategy 
The forecast for Betty, Sue, and Joe is stormy indeed. Because 
they claim emotional distress due to discrimination, they will be 
asked, either at depositions or through interrogatories, whether 
they have undergone psychotherapy within the past few years. 
They will answer yes. Defense counsel in each case will then seek 
to depose the psychotherapist and obtain copies of the therapy 
records. 
Defense counsel's purpose in seeking such information is, at 
least facially, legitimate. Defense counsel needs to know whether 
the plaintiff's claim of emotional distress is truthful or fabricated, 
and whether the distress is related to the discrimination or is caused 
by other personal problems in the plaintiff's life.9 
All three plaintiffs are aghast at the thought of their employers 
(and defense counsel) learning about their personal problems. 
They cringe at the thought of their former bosses, who have hurt 
them deeply, having access to this private and personal information. 
Each plaintiff moves for a protective order barring such discovery.lO 
What should the court do? 
C. JudiciaL Precedent 
This is a very perplexing problem. There is little statutory gui­
dancell or judicial precedent dealing with discovery of psychologi­
cal records in employee discrimination cases. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to draw upon the few pre-eRA 91 cases which dealt with 
this issue and some cases involving emotional distress outside the 
9. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Fritsch, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 'II 41,493, at 70,966 
(N.D. Ill. 1991) ("The existence of difficulties in the personal lives of plaintiffs contem­
poraneous with the alleged emotional distress they suffered would effect a determina­
tion as to whether the alleged conduct of defendants caused this distress."); Franklin 
Pub. Co. v. Massachusetts Cl)mm'n Against Discrimination, 519 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1988) (employee in pregnancy discrimination case suffered emotional distress 
both from discrimination and from her worries about carrying the pregnancy to term). 
10. The plaintiffs draw little comfort from the availability of confidentiality or­
ders, which merely prevent the defendant and the court from disseminating the discov­
ery materials to the general public. The plaintiffs want the materials shielded from the 
defendant as well. 
1l. A few states have statutes pertaining to discovery in sexual harassment cases. 
See, e.g., CALIF. GOy'T CODE § 11507.6 (West 1992). 
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civil rights context to ascertain a jurisprudence to govern these 
situations. 
Although emotional distress damages were not available in Ti­
tle VII cases prior to November 1991 (when eRA 91 took effect), 
such damages were available in some states, pursuant to either a 
state fair employment practices act12 or the common law of inten­
tional (or negligent) infliction of emotional distress.B The conven­
tional wisdom has been that the plaintiff has voluntarily opened 
herself14 up to a probe of her emotional history by contending that 
the alleged discrimination caused her emotional distress.15 By filing 
suit, she has virtually invited the defendant to explore her psycho­
logical records.16 
In deciding whether to compel production of these records, 
courts have considered the patient/psychotherapist privilege17 (and 
the exceptions thereto), privacy laws,18 and the general relevance of 
the information sought.19 The patient/psychotherapist privilege is 
waived, and the defendant can depose the plaintiffs therapist and 
compel production of the therapy records, if the plaintiff "in­
troduces his mental or emotional condition as an element of his 
claim ... and the judge ... finds that it is more important to the 
interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than that 
12. See, e.g., College-Town, Div. of Interco v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 508 N.E.2d 587, 594-95 (Mass. 1987) (construing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 
15lB, § 5 (1992». 
13. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Brick, 678 F. Supp. 111,112-13 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Mitchell v. 
Hutchings, 116 F.RD. 481, 483 (D. Utah 1987); Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.RD. 421, 
422-23 (D. Mass. 1984); Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.RD. 296, 298-99 
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 407 (Cal. 1987). 
14. The author chooses to use the female pronoun because most employment dis­
crimination victims are women. Gender neutral language would imply that men are 
generally as likely to be victims of employment discrimination as women are, which is 
not true. 
15. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1984); Lowe, 101 
F.RD. at 298; see also Montana ex rei. Mapes v. District Court, 822 P.2d 91, 94-95 
(Mont. 1991) (therapy records discoverable in worker's compensation case where em­
ployee alleges damage to lungs and central nervous system). Discovery is also permit­
ted in serious emotional distress cases not involving employment. See, e.g., Evans v. 
Club Mediteranee, S.A., 585 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
16. K.P. v. Packer, 826 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); see infra text accom­
panying note 22. 
17. See, e.g., Mapes, 822 P.2d at 94-95 (construing MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 
(1991»; K.P., 826 S.W.2d at 665-67 (construing TEX. R CIV. EVID. 510(d)(5». 
18. See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 410 (Cal. 1987) (construing 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1); see also John C. v. Martha A., 592 N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 (City Ct. 
1992) (construing U.S. CONST. amend. IX in housing case). 
19. See Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 331, 337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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the relationship between patient and [therapist] be protected."20 As 
one court has explained: 
[P]laintiff haled defendants into court and accused them of caus­
ing her various mental and emotional ailments. Defendants deny 
her charges. As a result, the existence and extent of her mental 
injuries is indubitably in dispute. In addition, by asserting a 
causal link between her mental distress and defendants' conduct, 
plaintiff implicitly claims it was not caused by a preexisting 
mental condition, thereby raising the question of alternative 
sources for the distress. We thus conclude that her mental state 
is in controversy.21 
Another court has opined, "[w]hen a [plaintiff] seeks affirmative 
relief that places his mental condition in issue, his actions have al­
ready compromised the privacy interest behind the privilege."22 
However, even the courts quoted above read the exceptions to 
the patient/psychotherapist privilege narrowly,23 or gave the plain­
tiff sanctuary under the state's privacy statutes.24 The courts have 
refused to compel the plaintiff to "discard entirely her mantle of 
privacy."25 
Another consideration is the distinction between emotional 
distress and emotional condition.26 Emotional distress has been de­
20. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B(c) (1992); see also MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, 
§ 135B(c) (1992) (patient/social worker privilege; same wording as patient/psychothera­
pist privilege). 
21. Vinson, 740 P.2d at 409. 
22. K.P. v. Packer, 826 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). 
23. Id. at 666. Importantly, in those cases where the court did permit either a 
mental examination of the plaintiff or a deposition of the plaintiff's therapist, the plain­
tiff had alleged severe emotional distress, not just emotional distress. See, e.g., 
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F. Supp. 635, 636 (E.D. Wis. 1984); Lowe v. Philadel­
phia Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.RD. 296, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Vinson, 740 P.2d at 407. 
24. Montana ex rei. Mapes v. District Court, 822 P.2d 91, 94 (Mont. 1991) (con­
struing MONT. CoNST. art. II, § 10). 
25. Vinson, 740 P.2d at 410 (restricting scope of questioning in mental examina­
tion for sexual harassment plaintiff); see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 
118 F.RD. 525,528-29 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (refusing to order mental examination in sexual 
harassment case); Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.RD. 421 (D. Mass. 1984) (refusing to 
order mental examination in employment discrimination case). The same holds true in 
the non-employment context. See, e.g., Midkiff v. Shaver, 788 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1990) (limiting scope of discovery to medical and hospital records related to 
mental anguish claims); Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 331, 336 (Ct. App. 
1992) (filing of "garden-variety" motor vehicle personal injury claim alleging emotional 
distress does not entitle defendant to inspect therapy records). 
26. "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous 
breakdown." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993). The Court 
held, in the sexual harassment context, that Title VII is violated when a "reasonable 
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fined as the anguish a normal person would feel under given cir­
cumstances,27 while emotional condition is something deeper. 
Injury to a plaintiff's emotional condition is akin to a permanent 
psychological scar,28 and is alleged by few plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases. Thus, if the plaintiff's emotional reaction to 
the discrimination is within the normal range of what might be ex­
pected, it is no business of the defendant's if the plaintiff also hap­
pens to have other problems which contemporaneously cause 
emotional distress or even affect her emotional condition. On the 
other hand, a plaintiff alleging damage to her emotional condition 
may be subject to more intrusive discovery. 
Given this distinction between emotional distress and emo­
tional condition, some courts have resolved the discovery problem 
person" would find the working conditions hostile or abusive. Id. at 371. Harris is 
relevant to, but not dispositive of, the discovery issue. Harris addresses the question of 
liability, i.e., how much emotional distress must the sexual harassment cause the victim 
in order to constitute a Title VII violation. This article addresses the question of dam­
ages, i.e., whether and when a plaintiff who seeks emotional distress damages for a Title 
VII violation should be required to disclose her mental health history to the defendant. 
There is no indication whether the defendant in Harris sought to discover the 
plaintiffs mental health records, or whether the plaintiff objected to such discovery 
request. Nonetheless, Harris says that "[a] discriminatorily abusive work environment, 
even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and 
often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from re­
maining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers." Id. at 370-71. By 
logical extension, if the employee's psychological well-being is not seriously affected, 
then the employee's "mental condition" is not in issue. See supra note 20 and accompa­
nying text. If "mental condition" is not in issue, the patient-psychotherapist privilege is 
not waived, and the plaintiff should not be required to disclose her mental health his­
tory in order to collect emotional distress damages. If, however, the employee's psy­
chological well-being is "seriously" affected, then a stronger argument can be made to 
compel disclosure of the therapy records, unless, of course, the discriminatory acts are 
so vile that they would be expected to "seriously" affect the psychological well-being of 
the "reasonable person." An example of such vile behavior would be the racial harass­
ment and discharge of our hypothetical Joe. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 for 
the section describing the hypotheticals. If Joe claims that the discrimination caused 
"serious" psychological harm, should he be compelled to produce his therapy records? 
Harris does not answer this question. 
For other cases distinguishing between "emotional distress" and "emotional condi­
tion" in employment discrimination claims, see Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421, 
422-23 (D. Mass. 1984) and Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 
531 (M.D. Fla. 1988). As a psychiatrist recently noted, "[s]evere distress is not 
equivalent to and does not necessarily result in a psychiatric diagnosis. Otherwise, 
practically everyone would be subject to a psychiatric diagnosis, since severe distress at 
one time or another is simply a consequence of being alive." Eric H. Marcus, Sexual 
Harassment Claims: Who is a Reasonable Woman?, 44 LAB. L.J. 646, 648 (1993).. 
27. Midkiff v. Shaver, 788 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
28. Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1988), superseded by statute 
as stated in Moore v. Wood, 809 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). 
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by determining 1) what is, and what is not, a normal emotional re­
action to a particular form of discrimination,29 and 2) whether the 
plaintiff in the particular case is alleging more distress than is nor­
ma1.30 The first determination is an objective one requiring no in­
quiry into the plaintiff's psychological history. The second 
determination is subjective and may, in some circumstances, require 
some probing of that history. The extent of that probe will depend 
on the type of distress, and the type of discrimination, alleged.31 
29. Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 409 (Cal. 1987) stated the following: 
A simple sexual harassment claim asking compensation for having to endure 
an oppressive work environment ... would not normally create a controversy 
regarding the plaintiffs mental state. To hold otherwise would mean that 
every person who brings such a suit implicitly asserts he or she is mentally 
unstable, obviously an untenable proposition. 
Id. Courts make a "common sense" determination of what is, and what is not, a "nor­
ma[" emotional reaction. See, e.g., Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194,204 
(1st Cir. 1987) Uury is entitled to make "common sense judgment of the emotional 
complications that would accompany the intentional discrimination Row[ett suffered"). 
30. In Vinson, the court opined that Ms. Vinson's allegations of "diminished se[f­
esteem, reduced motivation, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, fear, lessened ability to help 
others, loss of social contacts, anxiety, mental anguish, [and] loss of reputation" were 
"rather extreme." Vinson, 740 P.2d at 409-10; see also Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 
F.R.D. 421, 423 (D. Mass. 1984). 
31. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (sexua[ 
harassment case), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). The court stated the following: 
[The court must consider] such objective and subjective factors as the nature 
of the alleged harassment, the background and experience of the plaintiff, her 
coworkers, and supervisors, the totality of the physical environment of the 
plaintiffs work area, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment 
of the workplace both before and after the plaintiffs introduction into its envi­
rons, coupled with the reasonable exp"ectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily 
entering that environment. 
Id. The last clause of the sentence quoted from Rabidue ("coup[ed with the reasonable 
expectations") has been "round[y criticized and rejected." Robinson v. Jacksonville 
Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 530 (M.D. Fla. 1988). According to Robinson, the sub­
jectivity of the particular plaintiffs reaction must meet a minimum standard in order for 
the plaintiff to recover emotional distress damages. The plaintiff "must show that she is 
at [east as affected as the reasonable person under like circumstances." Id.; see also W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (5th 
ed. 1984). The EEOC disagrees, saying "[t]he fact that the [plaintiff] may be unusually 
emotionally sensitive and incur great emotional harm from discriminatory conduct will 
not absolve the [defendant] from responsibility for the greater emotional harm." 
EEOC Guidance, supra note 1, at 6225. The EEOC's standard does not conflict with 
the Supreme Court's "reasonab[e person" standard, as announced in Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993). The EEOC is referring to the question of 
damages in discrimination cases generally, while Harris applies only to the question of 
liability in sexual harassment cases. 
Cf. Lowe v. Philade[phia Newspapers, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 123, 126 (E.D. Pa. 1984) 
(stating that "[t]estimony concerning [race discrimination] plaintiffs mental disorder 
which causes him or her to perceive criticism as harassment, and to perceive racial slurs 
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Courts have held that a plaintiff should not be forced to expose her 
therapy records in order to vindicate her civil rights unless the de­
fense makes a strong showing that discovery is necessary to expose 
a false or exaggerated claim,32 or the plaintiff claims emotional dis­
tress beyond what might be expected under the circumstances.33 
The courts are guided by two public policies in this regard: the 
policy which encourages discrimination victims to exercise their 
civil rights,34 and the policy which encourages people to seek ther­
apy for their problems.35 Considering the former policy, one court 
has opined that if a sexual harassment victim claiming emotional 
distress was compelled to submit to a mental examination, 
"[p]laintiffs in these cases would face sexual denigration in order to 
secure their statutory right to be free from sexual denigration."36 
As to the latter policy, another court observed, "it is highly prob­
able that had [the employee] known the psychotherapist would be 
required to disclose his confidences, his trust in the psychotherapist 
would have been diminished and he may not have sought treatment 
where no racial motivation is present, is highly relevant to the question whether plain­
tiffs perception of racial harassment is correct.") But see Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 
F.RD. 481, 485 (D. Utah 1987) which states that "[p]ast sexual conduct does not, as 
defendants would argue, create emotional calluses that lessen the impact of un­
welcomed [sic] sexual harassment. The fact that the plaintiffs may welcome sexual ad­
vances from certain individuals has absolutely no bearing on the emotional trauma they 
may feel from sexual harassment that is unwelcome." Id.; see also Coates v. Whitting­
ton, 758 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1988) ("tortfeasor takes a plaintiff as he finds him"), 
superseded by statute as stated in Moore v. Wood, 809 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1991). 
32. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121-22 (1964); Coates, 758 S.W.2d at 
752 (defendant must show "connection or 'nexus' between [plaintiffs] pre-injury de­
pression and her post-injury embarrassment"). 
33. See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987). 
34. See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.RD. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (defendant in sexual 
harassment case claimed that plaintiff, a bar waitress, was the sexual aggressor and that 
plaintiff was fired for trying to "pick up" male customers; defendant sought names of all 
of plaintiffs sex partners over the past 10 years; court analogized case to rape cases 
prior to the enactment of shield laws). The court stated: 
Discovery of intimate aspects of plaintiffs' lives ... has the clear potential to 
discourage sexual harassment litigants from prosecuting lawsuits .... 
The possibility that discovery tactics such as that used by defendant 
herein might intimidate, inhibit, or discourage TItle VII plaintiffs ... from 
pursuing their claims would clearly contravene the remedial effect intended by 
Congress in enacting Title VII, and should not be tolerated by the federal 
courts. 
Id.; see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.RD. 525,531 (M.D. Fla. 
1988) (refusing to compel mental examination of plaintiff in sexual harassment case). 
35. See, e.g., Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 33, 126 F.RD. 422 (D. 
Mass. 1989). 
36. Robinson, 118 F.R.D. at 531. 
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at all. "37 These policies deserve special attention 10 employment 
discrimination cases. 




Much of what has been said thus far would apply to any case in 
which a plaintiff alleged emotional distress. But the public policy 
which encourages employment discrimination victims to come for­
ward38 should, as a corollary, grant these victims special protection 
against abusive discovery of their psychological histories. This pro­
tection is based on the "inference"39 of emotional distress in em­
37. Sabree, 126 F.R.D. at 426. 
38. This policy is evinced in 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5e(k) (1988 & Supp. III 1991), 
which provides that the losing party may be required, at the court's discretion, to pay 
attorneys fees to the prevailing party. Prevailing plaintiffs are almost always awarded 
attorneys fees; prevailing defendants are awarded attorneys fees only if the plaintiffs 
claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. See Christianburg Garment Co. v. 
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417-19 (1978); GOODMAN, supra note 1, § 2.10[4]. This statute 
encourages claims by giving the plaintiffs lawyer an added incentive to take the case on 
a contingent fee. 
The policy is also evinced by the simple, inexpensive administrative procedure by 
which a claimant can bring her claim at the EEOC or at the fair employment practices 
agency of the state. There are no filing fees and there are no strict rules of evidence. 
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 5 (1992). 
39. Buckley Nursing Home, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimina­
tion, 478 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (Mass. App. Ct.), rev. denied, 482 N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1985). 
The court stated that "the deep hurt usually felt by the victim of discrimination is the 
same no matter what guise the disparate treatment takes .... '[T]he finding of [discrim­
ination] alone permit[s] the inference of emotional distress as a normal adjunct of the 
[employer's] actions.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bournewood Hosp., Inc. v. Mas­
sachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 358 N.E.2d 235, 243 (Mass. 1976». 
An "inference" is a "process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to 
be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, 
already proved or admitted." BLACK'S LAW DlcrIONARY 917 (4th ed. 1968). An infer­
ence differs from a presumption in that "a presumption [is] a deduction which the law 
requires a trier of fact to make, [while] an inference [is] a deduction which the trier may 
or may not make, according to his own conclusions; a presumption is mandatory, an 
inference, permissible." Id. at 917-18. The inference of emotional distress in employ­
ment discrimination cases means that the factfinder may (but is not required to) assume 
that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress if the plaintiff alleges it. The burden is 
then on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff did not suffer distress. 
Bournewood Hospital differentiated employment discrimination claims from com­
mon law tort actions involving emotional distress: 
The standards applicable to an award of damages for emotional distress, pain, 
and suffering under [MASS. GEN.] L. ch. 151B as a means of enforcing the 
[Massachusetts] employment discrimination statutes are, for obvious reasons 
of statutory construction and policy, not as stringent as those applicable to 
actions of tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Bournewood Hosp. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 358 N.E.2d 235, 
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ployment discrimination cases. 
Unlike the common law tort of negligent infliction of emo­
tional distress, which usually involves one moment of shock fol­
lowed by lingering flashbacks and other evanescent indicia of 
distress,40 discrimination is usually a continuous or frequent source 
of stress.41 Each time Betty is sexually harassed or Joe is subjected 
to racial epithets, it is a new jolt to their emotions. In a "negligent 
infliction" action, the plaintiff must prove that her emotional dis­
tress "was accompanied by physical injury manifested by objective 
symptoms" in order to recover damages, because it is difficult to 
distinguish between those negligent acts which do cause emotional 
distress and those which do not.42 In such cases, courts must strike 
a proper balance between the "fear of fraudulent claims and the 
danger of shutting the doors of the courthouse to worthy plain­
tiffs."43 That balance is struck by requiring physical injury, which is 
more difficult to fabricate than "emotional distress."44 
But the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
requires no allegation or proof of physical injury.45 Distress is 
inferred from the purposive nature of the defendant's conduct, if 
the conduct is sufficiently "outrageous. "46 eRA 91 likens employ­
ment discrimination to intentional infliction of emotional distress, , 
243 n.ll (Mass. 1976). See generally Shawna H. Yen, Redressing the Victim of Racist 
Speech After R.A.V. v. St. Paul: A Proposal to Permit Recovery in Tort, 26 COLUM. J.L. 
& Soc. PROBS. 589,601-02 (1993) ("Studies show that victims of racist speech and other 
acts of racism experience high blood pressure, stress disorders, low self-esteem, depres­
sion, and psychological problems."); Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outra­
geous" Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against 
"Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579 (1993); Daniel S. Alcorn, Case 
Note, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 415, 423 (1991) ("Indignity, humiliation, and frustration are 
expected as common reactions to discrimination."). 
40. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 605 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1993). In Sulli­
van, the gas company negligently caused an explosion which burned a man's home 
while the man watched. The plaintiff alleged that he suffered emotional distress with 
symptoms including insomnia, gastrointestinal distress, nightmares, and difficulty driv­
ing and working, for months afterward. Id. at 806-07. 
41. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 12, at 62. In an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort, "[i]t is seldom that anyone such item of conduct is found alone 
in a case; and the liability usually has rested on a prolonged course of hounding." Id. 
Prosser and Keeton also note that the harm is magnified when the defendant has a 
position of power over the plaintiff. Id. § 12, at 61. That is apropos of an employment 
discrimination case, in which the boss has power over the employee's livelihood. 
42. See Sullivan, 605 N.E.2d at 808-10; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, 
§ 54, at 359-62. 
43. Sullivan, 605 N.E.2d at 808. 
44. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 54, at 362. 
45. See, e.g., Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658, 667 (Mass. 1991). 
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 12, at 64. "[I]f the enormity of the outrage 
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rather than negligent infliction of emotional distress.47 Where the 
discrimination is intentional, "feelings of inferiority, personal hu­
miliation, and the like are the rule rather than the exception."48 
Once the factfinder determines that intentional discrimination did 
occur, emotional distress is inferred.49 
Another reason to infer emotional distress in discrimination 
cases is found in the legislative purpose underlying the civil rights 
laws. These laws were enacted because no common law remedy 
existed to redress the discriminatory treatment of historically op­
pressed groups. But TItle VII as it existed between 1964 and 1991 
contained a gap. If our hypothetical Joe landed another job imme­
diately after he was fired, and if the new job paid as much as or 
more than the former job, Joe was not entitled to damages under 
TItle VII. TItle VII formerly provided only back pay and reinstate­
ment, not emotional distress damages. By making emotional dis­
tress damages recoverable under TItle VII, and by omitting any 
requirement that the plaintiff allege or prove that the distress 
caused physical pain, Congress plainly declared that emotional dis­
tress should be inferred in a discrimination claim. 
For these reasons, it is not accurate to say that a plaintiff in an 
employment discrimination case has "introduced" her mental "con­
dition" into the litigation by alleging emotional distress. It is more 
accurate to say that the defendant introduced it by discriminating 
against the plaintiff. 
itself carries conviction that there has in fact been severe and serious mental distress, 
which is neither feigned nor trivial, bodily harm is not required." Id. 
47. While CRA 91 provides emotional distress damages in cases of intentional 
discrimination, such damages are not available in "disparate impact" cases, which are a 
form of negligent discrimination. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(a)(I) (Supp. III 1991). In disparate 
impact situations, the employer did not intend to discriminate, but the employer's ac­
tions nonetheless had a discriminatory impact against a protected class. 
An example of "disparate impact" is a "no beard rule." Prohibiting beards might 
exclude a disproportionate number of blacks from employment, as evidenced by studies 
indicating that blacks are far more likely to suffer from pseudofolliculitis barbae, a con­
dition which makes shaving difficult, than whites are. See Richardson v. Quik Trip 
Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Iowa 1984). Such a rule is discriminatory unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the rule is "job-related" and consistent with "business 
necessity." 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1991). 
48. Larry Heinrich, The Mental Anguish and Humiliation Suffered by Victims of 
Housing Discrimination, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 44 n.22 (1992). 
49. Buckley Nursing Home, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimina­
tion, 478 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (Mass. App. Ct.), rev. denied, 482 N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1985). 
See supra note 39 for a discussion of the Buckley Nursing Home case. 
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III. THE PLAINTIFF'S NEED FOR SECRECY 
It becomes necessary at this point to illustrate exactly why 
plaintiffs fear releasing their psychotherapy records. The reason 
can be summed up in one (hyphenated) word: "Catch-22." That 
term, of course, is the title of a famous book (and movie) about 
World War II flyers who wanted to be excused from further combat 
missions because they had been driven insane by the ravages of 
war. The "catch" was that if they were sane enough to realize that 
they should not fly, they were sane enough to fly.50 
Several courts have adopted the "Catch-22" term in describing 
a plaintiff's right to privacy regarding mental health records in dis­
crimination cases.51 The "catch" is that on the one hand, if the 
plaintiff did not seek therapy during the time the discrimination was 
allegedly causing her emotional distress, or if she sought therapy for 
reasons having nothing to do with the job-related distress, the de­
fendant will argue that the plaintiff must not have been bothered 
too much by the discrimination. On the other hand, if the plaintiff 
was already in therapy at the time the discrimination occurred, or 
even if she sought therapy as a result of the discrimination, she 
must have told her therapist about all kinds of other problems in 
her life, and the defendant will argue that these problems indicate 
pre-existing emotional instability. The defendant will argue that 
this instability, rather than the discrimination, is the true cause of 
her emotional distress. 
Defense counsel therefore argues that if the plaintiff did not 
undergo therapy, the plaintiff is entitled to little or no damages. If 
the plaintiff did undergo therapy, defense counsel will argue that 
the plaintiff is still entitled to little or no damages because she was 
emotionally unstable even before the alleged discrimination. 
This Title VII remake of "Catch-22" rests on two fallacies. The 
first is the belief that everyone who goes to a therapist is mentally 
ill52 (hereinafter Proposition 1). The second is the belief that every­
one who does not go to a therapist feels psychologically well (here­
inafter Proposition 2). 
50. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 46-47 (1961). 
51. Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Vinson v. Superior 
Court, 740 P.2d 404, 411 (Cal. 1987). 
52. SARA D. GILBERT, WHAT HAPPENS IN THERAPY 18 (1982) ("Another com­
mon misconception is that only people who are mentally ill go to psychotherapists, so 
being in therapy-'having your head shrunk'-proves that you have serious mental 
problems. "). 
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Proposition 1 ignores the fact that many people seek therapy 
for reasons other than mental illness. 
Just as much of a physician's job is to keep people healthy, rather 
than simply to cure disease, much of psychotherapy is devoted to 
helping basically well people sort things out, resolve daily con­
flicts, and feel better about themselves .... 
. . . We all have thoughts, dreams, wishes, feelings or memo­
ries that we consider strange .... 
Therapists, though, have seen this kind of "normal crazi­
ness" in many people ....53 
As Freud said: 
[T]he healthy man ... possesses those factors in mental life which 
alone can bring about the formation . . . of a symptom, and we 
must conclude further that the healthy also have instituted re­
pressions and have to expend a certain amount of energy to 
maintain them . . . . The healthy man too is therefore virtually a 
neurotic .... 
The difference between nervous health and nervous illness 
(neurosis) is narrowed down therefore to a practical distinction, 
and is determined by the practical result-how far the person 
concerned remains capable of a sufficient degree of capacity for 
enjoyment and active achievement in life.54 
Yet even for mild, ordinary emotional problems, therapy can 
be intense, exploring the plaintiffs deepest, darkest secrets. Psy­
chotherapy frequently involves taking a detailed family and medical 
history from the patient, and then asking the patient to engage in 
free association,55 whereby the patient may reveal highly embar­
rassing tidbits which span the patient's entire life, and which the 
therapist's notes and testimony could reveal in graphic detai1.56 
53. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
54. SIGMUND FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 397-98 
(J. Riviere trans., authorized English rev. ed. 1943). 
55. FRANK J. BRUNO, THE FAMILY MENTAL HEALTH ENCYCLOPEDIA 144 (1991). 
56. See, for example, SILVANO ARIETI & JULES BEMPORAD, SEVERE AND MILD 
DEPRESSION: THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC APPROACH 318-20 (1978), describing the case 
history of a male patient with mild depression. The therapist's notes are as follows: 
[Patient] picture[d] himself having relations with beautiful women who threw 
themselves on him, with this type of fantasy frequently accompanied by mas­
turbation. [His] attempts at self-stimulation were not always successful and 
were often accompanied by shame and guilt .... 
[Patient had sex with a prostitute. She liked patient and asked him to 
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Freud instructed patients to "freely associate" by imagining 
themselves looking out the window on a railroad journey, and to 
observe and relate to him anything that entered the patient's mind. 
In modern terms, this might be described as videotaping the pa­
tient's mental images. The patient might recall some previously re­
pressed memory of childhood, or an embarrassing bodily 
dysfunction. Permitting discovery of the plaintiff's therapy records 
can be compared to requiring the plaintiff to hand over the "mental 
videotape." The horror and humiliation of doing so can be appreci­
ated if the reader would put this article down for a few minutes, 
relax, and let her mind roam freely with the "camcorder" running. 
How would the reader feel about turning the tape over to an 
adversary? 
Proposition 2 ("If they don't seek therapy, they must feel 
fine") ignores the fact that most people with emotional problems 
never undergo therapy. According to the American Psychiatric As­
sociation, 80% of depression sufferers "fail to recognize the illness 
and get the help they need. "57 An estimated 8.3 % of the popula­
tion suffer anxiety disorders which, in most cases, are not known to 
anyone but the patient and perhaps the patient's family, yet only 
23% of these people seek help.58 In many, if not most, cases, these 
disorders do not affect the person's ability to work. 
Thirty million Americans suffer the agony of recurring head­
aches.59 The most common type of headache is the "tension" (or 
"muscle contraction") headache, caused by emotional distress.6o 
Many people undergo psychotherapy (which literally means "treat­
ing the mind") for headache relief,61 reasoning that aspirin relieves 
the symptoms but does not treat the cause. 
Many great historical figures such as Lincoln and Churchill suf­
fered from depression.62 Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri was 
removed from the Democratic presidential ticket in 1972 because it 
was revealed that he had undergone electroshock therapy 12 years 
return] and she would offer her services gratis. After a great deal of delibera­
tion, [patient] did return but was impotent. 
Id. 
57. DIANNE HALES, DEPRESSION 15 (1989). 
58. JOHN H. GRIEST ET AL., ANXIETY AND ITS TREATMENT 18 (1986). 
59. JOEL R. SAPER & KENNETH R. MAGEE, FREEDOM FROM HEADACHES 15 
(1978). 
60. Id. at 96. 
61. Id. at 44-45. 
62. Nancy Wartik, Defeating Depression, AMERICAN HEALTH, Dec. 1993, at 38, 
39-40. 
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earlier for depression.63 When former Senator Lawton Chiles of 
Florida ran for governor in 1990, Chiles was hurt by revelations that 
he had left the Senate in 1988 because he felt "burnt out" and that 
he was treated for depression with the popular antidepressant drug 
Prozac (Chiles managed to win anyway).64 
In all likelihood, Lincoln, Churchill, Eagleton, and Chiles were 
no more ill than millions of Americans who do not seek therapy but 
who nonetheless have equally serious, or more serious, emotional 
problems. Yet if Eagleton or Chiles had ever filed a suit which al­
leged that the defendant had caused them emotional distress, de­
fense counsel would have had a field day exploring their therapy 
records. 
Proposition 2 also ignores the fact that there is little a psycho­
therapist can do for someone who suffers discrimination-related 
emotional distress. Such distress has an external cause, not an inter­
nal one. To suggest that Joe should seek therapy to cope with racial 
slurs is like suggesting that someone who knows his boss is going to 
hit him over the head with a hammer should take a few aspirin 
before he gets to work. From a strictly technical standpoint, the 
pain one feels from a hammer blow comes from within the body,65 
but the hammer is external. There is little or nothing a doctor can 
do before the blow, or even after the blow, to ease the pain. The 
best advice the doctor can give the patient is to wear a helmet or 
quit the job. But there is no helmet Joe can wear that will afford 
him the protection he needs at work, and thus there is no reason to 
expect Joe to seek therapy for his discrimination-related stress. 
Defense counsel will argue, of course, that if Joe is in therapy 
anyway, Joe is probably hypersensitive to insults. But that gets 
back to Proposition 1 ("Everyone who goes to a therapist is men­
tally ill"). Judges and juries should be competent to separate the 
stress caused by the discrimination from the stress caused by other 
factors in the plaintiff's life without requiring the plaintiff to surren­
der therapy records in discovery. 
63. MICHAEL BARONE ET AL., THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1980 489 
(1979). The Eagleton incident prompted a noted historian to observe, "American igno­
rance of mental health being what it is, even a mild history of depression disqualifies a 
politician from running for national office." WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND 
THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICA 1932-1972 1286 (1974). 
64. Holly Idelson, Governors Find Re-Election a Trickier Proposition, 48 (::ONG. 
Q. 3838, 3840 (1990). 
65. "[A]II pain is mental, and centers in the brain ...." Hargis v. Knoxville 
Power Co., 94 S.E. 702, 703 (N.C. 1917), quoted in KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 12, 
at 55 n.5. 
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A well-adjusted black man of normal sensitivity will suffer 
emotional distress if he is subjected to racial slurs at work, as will a 
well-adjusted woman whose co-workers constantly leer at her. 
Should these victims be expected to seek psychotherapy? And if 
they are in therapy, should they be expected to dwell on this prob­
lem with the therapist? What would a psychotherapist tell these 
victims? They are suffering the way any normal person in their cir­
cumstances would. They are like the tenant whose apartment is full 
of rats-rats in the bathtub, rats in the kitchen, rats in her child's 
bed.66 If the tenant sues her landlord and alleges that the infesta­
tion is causing her emotional distress, should the landlord be able to 
inspect the tenant's therapy records? Is there anything a therapist 
could do for her anyway? The therapist cannot get rid of the rats. 
That is why discrimination-related emotional distress is action­
able even in the absence of psychological or psychiatric consulta­
tion, expert testimony, or physical symptoms.67 Physical symptoms 
are unnecessary because a discrimination victim can suffer consid­
erable distress without necessarily feeling stomach pain, head pain, 
insomnia, or other indicia of distress.68 And even if the plaintiff 
does suffer physical symptoms, is it really fair to expect him or her 
to take medication?69 This is akin to asking the man who is about 
to be hit with a hammer to take aspirin. The medication might help 
a little, but it frequently has unpleasant side effects and it never 
solves the problem. 
IV. THE SOLUTION 
Two principles should provide guidance in deciding whether to 
permit discovery of an employment discrimination plaintiff's psy­
chological history. First, discrimination is emotionally distressing to 
66. The rat analogy is a slight variation of the cockroach and rodent problem in 
Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658, 660 n.3 (Mass. 1991) (holding that physical injury 
is not necessary to recover emotional distress damages). 
67. See EEOC Guidance, supra note 1, <j[ 5360, at 6226 ("The 'plaintiffs own 
testimony may be solely sufficient to establish humiliation or mental distress."') (quot­
ing Williams v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981»; Hy-Vee 
Food Stores, Inc. v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 526 (Iowa 1990); Franklin 
Publishing Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 519 N.E.2d 798, 800 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1988); Buckley Nursing Home, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 478 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985). 
68. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 12, at 64. 
69. "[T]he law does not tolerate employment discrimination and neither does the 
law require victims of discrimination to develop a tolerance for it." Alcorn, supra note 
39, at 423 (quoting Appellee's Brief and Argument at 8, Hy-Vee Food Stores v. Iowa 
Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 1990) (No. 88-934». 
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a person of normal sensitivity.70 Second, everyone should be enti­
tled to seek psychotherapy without fear that the therapy sessions 
will be revealed to their adversaries if they become plaintiffs in em­
ployment discrimination cases,?1 With these principles in mind, 
courts should take the following steps to resolve the discovery 
problem. 
The court should first focus on the offensiveness of the em­
ployer's alleged discriminatory conduct.72 Betty's co-workers are 
uncouth and have created a hostile work environment. Her boss 
ignored the problem and, to make things worse, transferred Betty 
to a less rewarding job. This would certainly cause some emotional 
distress to any employee. Sue's case is not so clear. She is alleging 
that she was terminated because she was pregnant, but a non-preg­
nant employee was also dismissed, and the company was downsiz­
ing anyway. She did, of course, lose her job, which would be highly 
distressing for anyone. In Joe's case the conduct was despicable 
and would obviously cause distress to the most well-adjusted black 
employee. 
The court should then look at the type of distress the plaintiff 
alleges she suffered as a result of the discrimination.73 Rarely are 
the plaintiffs specific symptoms listed in the complaint, so the court 
should ask the plaintiff to list these symptoms in a sworn affidavit 
attached to a motion for a protective order. Of course, the defend­
ant could also ascertain these symptoms by deposing the plaintiff or 
through interrogatories. The court can then make a common-sense 
determination of whether these symptoms are more severe than 
what might be expected if the plaintiffs allegations about the dis­
criminatory acts are true. 
For example, if Betty simply says, "I suffer headaches from the 
harassment," the defendant should be entitled to inquire whether 
Betty suffered headaches before the harassment began. If Betty 
admits that she did, but asserts that the harassment has made the 
headaches worse, that should be enough to halt any further intru­
sion into her privacy. As long as the jury knows that Betty was 
previously a headache sufferer and merely claims that harassment 
exacerbated the headaches, there is no need to tell the jury that 
Betty had an abortion. If, on the other hand, Betty claims in her 
70. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra note 26. 
73. Davis v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 331, 335-36 (Ct. App. 1992); Midkiff v. 
Shaver, 788 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
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affidavit that her headaches are due entirely to the harassment, the 
court has a more difficult choice. Betty, of course, is lying. But the 
court and the defendant do not know that. Given the severity of 
Betty's alleged symptoms, the defendant should have the right to 
seek an in camera74 inspection of the records by the judge, or to 
compel the therapist to submit an affidavit to be read by the judge 
only, not defense counsel. Alternatively, Betty's regular physician 
could be compelled to produce any records which would indicate 
whether Betty has complained about headaches in the recent past.75 
If the judge determines that Betty lied, then the case is probably 
over and Betty will be charged with contempt or perjury. 
This procedure, of course, does not fully comport with the ad­
versary process.76 If the judge prohibits discovery, defense counsel 
74. Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 33, 126 F.R.D. 422, 426 (D. Mass. 
1989); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 990, 998 (Mass. 1993) (finding that vic­
tim's therapy records in rape case should be reviewed by the judge "in camera, out of 
the presence of all other persons" (emphasis added». 
75. In most cases, the physician's records are less embarrassing to the plaintiff 
than the psychotherapy records are. See In re "B", 394 A.2d 419, 425 (Pa. 1978). The 
EEOC stated, "[s]ince medical evidence is important, a medical release should be ob­
tained from the [plaintiff] whenever emotional or physical harm is alleged." EEOC 
Guidance, supra note 1, CJI 5360, at 6227 (emphasis added). What this means, of course, 
is that the EEOC thinks that any plaintiff who alleges "emotional harm" should be 
compelled to sign a form which requests her physicians to send copies of her "medical" 
records to the defendant. "Medical" records should not be interpreted to mean "ther­
apy" or "psychiatric" records, because the EEOC Guidance also differentiates between 
"medical" and "psychiatric" records. Id. Nonetheless, "medical" records are highly 
sensitive and can be extremely embarrassing. The EEOC's position that the medical 
records should be released whenever the plaintiff claims "emotional harm" is clearly at 
odds with many cases, such as Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 408-09, 411 (Cal. 
1987), which held that a routine allegation of emotional distress does not make the 
plaintiffs emotional condition an issue. In the author's opinion, the EEOC Guidance is 
overbroad in this regard and will deter many discrimination victims from exercising 
their rights. This EEOC Guidance was promulgated on July 14, 1992, during the wan­
ing months of the Bush Administration. The author hopes that the EEOC under the 
Clinton Administration will take a more flexible approach on "medical releases." 
76. According to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, "'[t]he danger lurk­
ing in the practice of ... in camera review [of privileged documents] by the trial judge is 
a confusion between the roles of trial judge and defense counsel. The judge is not 
necessarily in the best position to know what is necessary to the defense.'" Common­
wealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992, 1001 (Mass. 1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Clancy, 554 N.E.2d 395, 398-99 (Mass. 1988». 
However, the United States Supreme Court has upheld in camera inspections of 
records over the objection that defendants and defense counsel are thereby barred from 
seeing the records which the plaintiff supplied to the court and which the court used to 
decide the discovery dispute. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-61 (1987), the 
Court observed that 
[a]lthough this rule denies Ritchie the benefits of an "advocate's eye," we note 
that the trial court's discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is aware of 
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will never have the opportunity to inspect the records upon which 
the judge made the decision.77 But this approach meets the defend­
ant halfway, which is better than not at all, and certainly better than 
all the way, since unfettered discovery could devastate a plaintiff 
who had undergone therapy but who had not suffered headaches 
prior to the discrimination. 
Sue is, in effect, alleging severe emotional distress. Although 
stress can cause a miscarriage,78 the alleged discriminatory conduct 
in her case might, or might not, cause a "normal" employee to mis­
carry. Some discovery into Sue's personal life, including her marital 
problems of a year ago, should probably be permitted. On the 
other hand, Joe's allegation of emotional distress is quite normal 
under the circumstances. Therefore, discovery of psychological 
records is unwarranted in Joe's case. 
Another approach would be to ask the plaintiff to place a dol­
lar maximum on the monetary recovery she seeks for emotional dis­
tress. If the figure is modest in relation to the offensiveness of the 
harm alleged, there is no reason to intrude into the therapy records. 
On the other hand, if the figure is high in proportion to the harm, 
then perhaps the plaintiff has "invited" close scrutiny of her psycho­
logical records. 
The court should also consider the remoteness of events noted 
in the plaintiffs psychological records. Although events of the dis­
tant past can affect a patient's current emotional status, it seems 
ridiculous to permit discovery which would reveal events which 
happened long ago.79 Here again, a halfway approach is sensible. 
specific information contained in the file ... , he is free to request it directly 
from the court, and argue in favor of its materiality. 
Id. at 60. 
This passage from Ritchie prompted the Massachusetts court to invoke the "Catch­
22" term: 
A threshold requirement, so framed, could place the defendant in a "Catch­
22" situation. "To gain access to the privileged records defendant must specifi­
cally allege what useful information may be contained in the target records. 
However, defendant has no way of making these specific allegations until he 
has seen the contents of the records." 
Bishop, 617 N.E.2d at 996 n.6 (quoting People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 96 (Ill.) (Simon, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988». The court in Bishop nevertheless 
endorsed the in camera procedure in rape cases, thus modifying its earlier holding in 
Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d at 1002-03. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d at 997. 
77. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d at 996-98. 
78. KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, § 12, at 55-56, § 54, at 363. 
79. Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Utah 1987) ("[E]vidence of 
sexual conduct which is remote in time or place to plaintiffs' working environment is 
irrelevant."). 
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Privacy interests are not served merely by limiting discovery to 
records of recent therapy. Even recent records may include infor­
mation about the plaintiff's childhood and adolescence that could 
be embarrassing. The court should, as best as possible, confine dis­
covery to "the medical and hospital records and questions related 
to the medical attention sought for the symptoms of the ... mental 
anguish claims. "80 
This is admittedly problematical. It is difficult to separate the 
records pertaining to the discrimination-related stress and the stress 
caused by other problems in the plaintiff's life. In many cases, it 
will be like trying to unscramble eggs. However, an effort should 
be made. The court might seek the opinion of an independent fo­
rensic expert on the causation question.81 The more remote in time 
the other stressful incidents are from the discrimination, the heavier 
the burden should be on the defendant to establish a causal link. 82 
In close cases, the court might permit the plaintiff's therapist to 
be deposed but not permit the therapist's notes to be revealed. The 
notes will often be misleading and prejudicial,83 if not incompre­
hensible. The live testimony of the therapist will be more probative 
of the plaintiff's circumstances. If appropriate, limitations can be 
placed on defense counsel's probing into certain remote events. 
In taking these steps, the court should be wary of the possibil­
ity that the plaintiff has exaggerated the outrageousness of the de­
fendant's discriminatory conduct. Joe, for example, was able to 
avoid discovery by alleging that his boss constantly uttered racial 
slurs. What if it turns out that the boss engaged in such misconduct 
only when Joe himself used racial slurs? In the end, the jury might 
find that Joe was indeed a victim of racial discrimination and might 
award Joe a significant sum in emotional distress damages. How­
ever, because Joe exaggerated the facts in his affidavit (he did not 
lie, he just omitted some of the facts), the court might be justified in 
ordering a remittitur, lowering the monetary award to Joe on the 
basis that the defendant should have been permitted to conduct 
some discovery into Joe's psychological history. 
Finally, the court should hesitate to draw adverse inferences 
from the lack of physical symptoms. Just because Joe did not suffer 
headaches or insomnia or need to take medication does not mean 
80. Midkiff v. Shaver, 788 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
81. Ferrell v. Brick, 678 F. Supp. 111, 113 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
82. Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 484. 
83. Ferrell, 678 F. Supp. at 112. 
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that Joe did not suffer emotional distress. The lack of physical 
symptoms should not provide an excuse to delve into the plaintiff's 
psychological past.84 
CONCLUSION 
Millions of American workers are effectively thwarted from 
exercising their civil rights merely because they have undergone 
psychotherapy. The possibility that they will be forced to tum over 
their therapy records to the defendant leaves them like turtles with­
out shells, unprotected from the ravages of the litigation process. 
There is always, to be sure, a danger that plaintiffs will exaggerate 
their claims of emotional distress if defendants are not permitted to 
conduct comprehensive discovery. Hopefully this article and the 
authorities cited herein will be useful to courts and litigants as they 
strive to reconcile these competing interests. 
84. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "infer­
ence" of emotional distress in discrimination cases. 
